Arguing Constitutional Violations of Security of Person under Section 7 of the Charter

         Canadian Charter of Rights and FreedomsLife, liberty and security of person7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.It is not every qualification or compromise of a person`s security that comes within the reach of s. 7 of the Charter. The qualification or compromise must be significant enough to warrant constitutional protection. To suggest that any qualification or compromise of security of the person engages s. 7 risks trivializing the protections of the Charter: Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143, at p. 151. Security of the person protects both the physical and psychological integrity of the individual: Blencoev. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 55; R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at pp. 56 and 173; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at paras. 64 & 71. For a restriction of security of the person to be established, the state action in issue must have a serious and profound effect on a person’s psychological integrity: New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at paras. 59-60. The descriptive “serious state-imposed psychological stress” fixes two requirements that must be met before the security of the person interest protected by s. 7 becomes engaged. First, the psychological harm must be state imposed, that is to say, the harm must result from actions of the state.  Second, the psychological harm or prejudice must be serious. It follows that not every form of psychological prejudice or harm will constitute a violation of s. 7: Blencoe,